INTRODUCTION
The innovation in cyber-physical systems (CPSs) opens a rising field of multi-disciplinary cooperation, linking computer science and control theory with several engineering areas, natural sciences, and medicine. 1 Increasingly, CPSs are improving performance, productivity, and energy efficiency in the control of physical processes. Researchers and practitioners are designing and prototyping autonomous vehicles (AVs) with higher levels of automation and connectivity. 2 Similarly, the healthcare sector is developing novel medical applications to better support and treat patients, including autonomous implantable
devices and system architectures for monitoring patients in hospitals
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. c 2019 The Authors. Systems Engineering published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. or at home. 3 Other relevant CPS applications include industrial control systems (ICSs) in manufacturing and process plants, robotics, control systems in critical infrastructures providing essential services to communities 4 (eg, smart grids, water and wastewater systems), and autonomous military defense missiles, among others.
Considering the promising developments and the critical applications of CPSs, government agencies and industrial partnerships regard the research efforts in CPSs as a priority. 5 Consequently, publications in the field of CPSs have experienced a positive exponential rate in annual publications since Hellen Gill coined the term in 2006 at the National Science Foundation (NSF) of the United States. 6, 7 Systems Engineering. 2019; 1-22. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/sys 1 However, some researchers acknowledge the challenge to provide an exact conceptualization of CPSs due to the broadness of the term. 8 As a result, the current conceptualizations and representations of CPSs do not properly frame its key features, that is, the essential components and the interactions present in this class of systems.
Furthermore, the relations between levels of automation and human supervision are ambiguous in CPSs. For instance, the NSF defines CPSs as "engineered systems that are built from, and depend upon, the seamless integration of computation and physical components." 9 In similar terms, Rajkumar et al. 1 characterized CPSs as "physical and engineered systems whose operations are monitored, controlled, coordinated, and integrated by a computing and communication core." In general, these and other definitions stress the integration of computers to control physical components. According to Alur, 5 this cyber-physical integration arises from sensors and actuators reacting to the physical world. Yet, these definitions tend to assume that CPSs are autonomous systems controlling a set of technical components. In doing so, there is a risk of overlooking or failing to distinguish the vital and evolving roles of humans in the control architectures of CPSs, which are necessary features to assess the safety and security of the system without fuzzy interpretations. Therefore, we stress the need to conceive CPSs as a particular type of socio-technical systems characterized by some new and enhanced key features. [10] [11] [12] Increasingly, CPSs are exposed to security attacks, including intentional cyber threats that can go beyond the information domain and "cascade" into physical hazards in the energy domain. The Stuxnet attack in 2010 to a nuclear facility clearly evidenced this case in reality, 13 while recently perpetrated cyber-attacks mentioned in this paper show the increasing need for cybersecurity in safety-critical CPSs.
The sources of safety risks are not restricted to component failures and accidents anymore. In CPSs, safety is an emergent property that does not necessarily improve solely by enhancing the reliability of individual components or software. 14 As Clements accurately affirmed: "we never analyze a system-we analyze only a conceptual model of the system." 19 For example, practitioners widely rely on piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs)
among the system representations to conduct hazard identification in the process industry. 19 Similarly, system and software engineers usually rely on models such as functional block diagrams and Unified
Modeling Language (UML) diagrams to represent the software architecture of computer systems and conduct threat analysis. 20 Because these and other representations are not tailored to include the complex interactions in CPSs and their related risks, the field of safety analysis requires a new systems engineering framework that includes the complex dependencies and the security challenges of CPSs. 21, 22 This paper addresses the following three research questions.
(1) Which are the key features of CPSs and their relation with other system types?
(2) What levels of automation and human control interactions challenge the design of CPSs?
(3) How can system designers and risk analysts describe the features of CPSs in a comprehensive representation for safety and security analysis?
For each question, we discuss the implications for safety and security risk analysis using recent historical incidents and describing the demonstrates the suitability of this representation in a case in the maritime sector, specifically as a framework to analyze a real autonomous surface vehicle (ASV). Finally, Section 6 concludes and opens the field for future research in safety and security risk analysis of CPSs.
THE EMERGENCE OF CPS: TWO PERSPECTIVES FOR DERIVATION OF KEY FEATURES
A widespread definition of a CPS is the "integration of computation and physical processes." 23 Nevertheless, the broadness of this and other definitions may obscure the identification of the key features of CPSs, that is, the common characteristics that proof the utility for grouping this wide set of systems into a common class.
When examining CPS applications, one could question the benefits of conceptualizing such a wide set of applications (eg, autonomous vehicles, smart grids, robotics, cutting-edge ICSs, smart medical devices, and military defense systems) in a common class as CPSs.
Indeed, this conceptualization would be useful only if it provided practical insights and facilitated the solution of common issues in these applications.
For example, the class of system "car" is useful to provide safety standards and design guidance to different manufacturers, even if they use different technologies and provide accessory features beyond road driving. Furthermore, despite cars being considerably different when compared to other vehicles (eg, motorcycles, trucks, bicycles), one can group all these systems as "road vehicles" to generate common infrastructure and traffic regulations.
Considering the CPS class, Lee 23, 24 identified a series of foundational challenges in the abstractions used in computation. He stressed the need of computer systems to fit the timing requirements of CPSs, that is, concurrent and real-time calculations in networked systems interacting with the physical world.
Focusing on the principles of design, modeling, and verification of the computational components and their integration, Alur 5 proposed a set of key features of CPSs. Particularly, he mentions reactive computations, concurrency, feedback control, real-time computation, and safety-critical applications. Whereas this set of features is a useful starting point to categorize CPSs, we argue the need to include the role of humans 25 in CPS design architectures as a key feature of CPSs with safety and security implications. Moreover, we complement Alur's conceptualization with an analysis of other rising systems and paradigms associated-but not identical-to CPSs.
Acknowledging the broadness and fuzziness of the CPS field, Gunes et al. 26 presented a comprehensive survey comparing CPSs to related research fields and concepts such as the Internet of Things (IoT), Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communications, and mechatronics, among others. However, they did not identify explicitly the key features of CPSs for the context of their safety and security challenges, that is, for the protection of CPSs goals against both unintentional and deliberate sources of risk potentially impacting the system or its environment. 27, 28 In this section, we examine the features of CPSs comparing two perspectives of antecedents, applications, and trends for future developments. The first perspective is a well-known approach in the literature, starting the evolution of CPSs from embedded systems (ESs). 5, 7, 8, 29 Still, we introduce how this perspective is also associated with the related field of the IoT, blurring the distinctions between CPSs and the IoT. The second perspective opens a wider landscape of CPSs not necessarily rooted in ESs. Instead, this perspective considers the evolution of control systems in industrial processes and manufacturing leading to CPSs. 6, 10, [30] [31] [32] Within this second perspective, even if there is a tendency to embed the control devices inside the physical components, 31, 33 we argue that these features are not essential to define CPSs. By synthesizing the two perspectives previously mentioned, in this section, we define the key and accessory features of CPSs, stressing the need to include explicitly the roles of human operators in CPSs. We finally discuss the association of these features with real cases of safety and security issues in CPSs in recent years.
First perspective: From ESs to CPSs (and the IoT)
Commonly, the literature considers CPSs as an upgraded stage of ESs. 5, 34 In simple terms, ESs are small computers that are not visible to the users. Their origins can be traced back to the 1970s, 6 consisting of "hardware and software integrated within a mechanical or an electrical system designed for a specific purpose". 5 They are widely implemented in consumer electronics, for example, TVs, digital cameras, smartphones, washing machines, and microwaves. Furthermore, ESs are used in safety-critical applications performing distinct tasks, usually operating in isolated configurations without integration with other real-time control functions.
In contrast to general-purpose computers and industrial controllers, ESs are restricted by their smaller sizes, requiring high levels of design efficiency. Namely, according to Marwedel, 29 ESs should be:
• Energy efficient: considering limited power sources.
• Run-time efficient: avoiding excessive computational time execution and use of memory, energy, and other limited resources.
• Small in code size: considering limited memory size in embedded microcontrollers.
• Lightweight: as they are incorporated into portable physical devices, whose function might be affected by additional weight.
• Low-cost: to achieve cost-effective applications compared to other alternatives in the market.
In many cases, ESs operate in open control loops, that is, without incorporating a feedback from the physical processes. This is the case of many consumer electronic goods, being a washing machine a typical example. Moreover, some ESs also operate in open loops in some safety-critical applications, particularly those that do not depend on computers closing the control loops. Indeed, ESs could be used solely on sensor devices, providing data to human operators or to application platforms as a service. Moreover, designers have traditionally conceived ESs in isolation, performing a particular function independent of other ESs and of their environment.
From this perspective, the CPS concept is a paradigm shift for the ESs community. A paradigm shift is a fundamental change in basic concepts describing a scientific discipline. In our case, the aforementioned features contrasting ESs with general-purpose computers are no longer the main issues when designing CPSs. Indeed, "in CPSs, embedded computers and networks monitor and control the physical processes, usually with feedback loops where physical processes affect computations and vice versa." 6 Thus, the integration of communication networks and feedback loops from physical processes describe the frontier of the shift from ESs to CPSs.
CPSs and the IoT
In parallel, there is a growing interest on the progressive connection of ESs through computer networks, and specifically to the Internet.
Enabling technologies, such as low-power wireless networks, communication protocols, and cloud computing, open the possibility for a new range of applications developed from the interaction of devices connected to the Internet. The design paradigm behind these applications is known as the IoT. 35 
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Embedded systems F I G U R E 1 First perspective: CPS and IoT developments from a perspective centered in ESs concept according to the historical backgrounds and orientations of different communities. 36 Some communities argue that the IoT is a key foundation that enables the deployment of CPSs. 38 However, we stress that this field of progress in the IoT is related-but not identical nor essential-to the field of CPSs. For IoT applications, a real-time feedback control of physical processes may not be necessary. Instead, many IoT system architectures develop mobile apps or cloud applications as final services, 36, 37 using the integration of smart sensors, wireless networks, internet access, and cloud platforms with advanced data analytics. In contrast, the final services in CPSs are physical systems performing real-time control tasks in the physical world.
Some IoT applications provide smart actuator commands from realtime sensor readings. However, these actions are sometimes limited to the activation of information functions (eg, message display, sound notifications) for surveillance, logistics, and monitoring. 36, 37 These simple actions are limited to information awareness, while not completing a physical process by themselves. Instead, CPSs perform control actions in a way that alters the new state of the sensor readings and consequently the states in the control loop by actuator commands with physical effects.
Finally, there is some degree of overlapping between the fields of CPSs and the IoT. 34, 39 Mainly, some CPS applications are being connected to the Internet to use data-accessing and processing services . 10, 40 Thus, we establish a category of CPS-IoT from the intersection of these two fields, namely, those CPSs built from ESs that include Internet connection in their network configurations.
From this analysis, Figure 1 illustrates CPSs and the IoT as different advances in ESs capabilities. Nevertheless, the overlapping CPS-IoT field (also known as IoT-based CPSs 34 ) incorporates both set of capabilities in these systems.
Second perspective: From cybernetics to CPSs
The field of cybernetics established the foundations for engineered feedback control systems interacting with the physical world, even before the revolution in digital computation and network communications. 6 Norbert Wiener opened the field of cybernetics in 1948, from applications in automatic weapon systems expanding to a wide field of technical systems and even to human behavior and neuroscience. 41 Considering this perspective from the evolution in cybernetics, the notion of CPSs as strictly centered in ESs would be very restrictive.
Many control applications tightly coupling cyber and physical pro- Nowadays, NCSs are evolving into distributed configurations, 31, 44 enabling task coordination and information exchange among automated control subsystems. These distributed networked control systems (DNCSs) are therefore characterized by their capabilities for cooperative control, 31 thus operating as a type of system of systems (SoS). 45 From a system-theoretic perspective, we argue that an SoS integrates formerly independent feedback control loops into an interdependent set of control loops, allowing the realization of cooperative tasks to achieve a higher common goal. Illustrative examples include independent robotic arms holding and rotating together an object in a factory, the steering and braking systems of a car autonomously interacting to avoid a collision, among others. These interactive feedback control loops could also include human supervision and manual control. In the future, these systems could be controlled by artificial intelligence (AI), replacing the preprogrammed algorithms by neural networks and self-improving algorithms.
In summary, Figure 2 
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The key features of CPS
• Internet access: in contrast to the IoT paradigm, CPSs can operate without using Internet protocols.
• Fully automated control and AI: CPSs could operate in semiautonomous configurations and with traditional algorithms.
From the previous analysis, we affirm that DNCSs share the rele- intervention are still present and should be considered. 22 In summary, Figure 3 illustrates the field of CPSs with some general subsets describing accessory features in dynamic growth.
Therefore, we define as key features of CPSs the combination of the following: 
Compatibility of CPS features in security for safety cases
The realization of cyber threats disrupting SCADA systems and provoking physical consequences could be traced back to the Maroochy water breach in 2000. [48] [49] [50] This cyber-attack against the Maroochy Water Services in Australia led to release of one million liters of untreated water into local rivers and parks. A malicious insider (an exemployee of the system supplier company) used unsecure radio communications to access the control system remotely. Subsequently, the attacker used his knowledge of the system to reconfigure the pumping stations and disrupt the alarms, causing the system to fail in unexpected ways and impeding a rapid response to recover. Even if the water treatment plant was not considered a CPS at the time and may not share all the CPS features, this cyber-attack raised awareness of the security vulnerabilities in critical infrastructures and the potential for physical harm. 51 Persistently, however, researchers agree on the Stuxnet worm attack to an Iranian nuclear facility in 2010 as the turning point on the physical safety risks exploited by cyber threats in the context of CPSs. 48, 49, [52] [53] [54] [55] The Stuxnet worm entered the system through a USB drive that an operator plugged to a Windows computer. Then, the worm propagated throughout the SCADA system infecting the PLCs connected to the network. Finally, these PLCs controlling the nuclear centrifuges issued malicious commands to manipulate the rotor speed in ways difficult to detect by the system and the operators, disrupting the physical processes in the nuclear facility and damaging the nuclear reactors.
Neither this nuclear facility nor the Maroochy Water Services plant was composed exclusively of ESs and their system architectures were not completely autonomous. Nonetheless, the control system was not effectively isolated from cyber threats coming from the environment.
Additionally, human operators were unable to respond promptly to the disruptions due to lack of awareness induced by the way the sophis- Considering other relevant attacks to industrial CPS applications, the German Steel Mill cyber-attack in 2014 caused multiple components of the system to fail, leading to massive physical damages. 56 Using spear phishing e-mails, the attacker gained access to the corporate network and then penetrated into the plant network controlling the physical processes. More recently in 2017, the TRITON malware attack disrupted a petrochemical plant in Saudi Arabia. 57, 58 Beyond security concerns of data availability and even operational concerns of continuity in plant operations, this cyber-attack intended to trigger a dangerous explosion in the plant (ie, physical harm). By conducting standard IT intrusion mechanisms, the attackers penetrated into the network and targeted the connected safety instrumented system (SIS). 59 Even though the SIS operated with a proprietary network protocol, enough knowledge of the proprietary system and its connections to general IT networks enable this type of cyber-attacks to target the SIS and induce physical harm. 60 Embedded CPS applications, such as autonomous vehicles, are also vulnerable to physical harm when subjected to cyber-attacks.
Researchers have identified a wide range of cybersecurity vulnerabilities in cars and the potential manipulation of the engine, the steering, and braking system. 61 In 2015, researchers demonstrated how a Jeep model was hacked through Wi-Fi connection, that is, a wireless network providing Internet access. 62 Not only they disrupted the infotainment system, but also they were able to access the CAN bus (the vehi- For more historical attacks to CPSs and empirical demonstrations in research environments, Humayed et al 49 described an ample list of attacks to ICSs, smart grids, smart medical devices, and modern cars.
They used the description of cross-domain attacks proposed by Yampolskiy et al 48 to discretize the influenced elements (targeted by the attack) from the affected elements (causing the actual damages).
These types of cyber-attacks disrupting physical systems require broadening the scope from security and privacy in CPSs 67 to consider the potential for physical harm and the implications for safety. 27, 68 This broader view stresses the need for a combined safety and security risk analysis in CPS, where security and safety goals coexist and require an integration process. 15,69
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ROLE OF HUMANS IN CPSS
In this section, we analyze the implications of the (semi)automated control feature in CPSs, considering the role of humans and their potential influence as sources of safety and security risks.
Levels of automation and CPSs
To classify a system as a CPS, the required level of automation is currently unclear. 32 Therefore, we propose as a conceptual threshold, the level where the intended system design assigns the computer the role to close the feedback control loops. In other words, computers have the capacity to gather inputs from sensors and send commands to actuators without the human as an intermediate. Attributing this threshold of automation is not a trivial task because it opens the discussion of the role of humans in CPSs. Particularly, this explicit relationship between a threshold of automation and CPSs as a class of systems serves two relevant purposes.
As first purpose, we delimit the concept of CPSs to the widely agreed domain in the CPSs community, referring to these systems as controlled by a computational core. 1, [5] [6] [7] [8] The real-time feedback control of physical processes requires hybrid system modeling to integrate the discrete logic of cyber processes with the continuous dynamics of physical processes. Therefore, while some research communities use the concept of CPSs referring to applications in a broader domain, we emphasize this delimitation to frame the key features of CPSs and avoid fuzziness in the concept.
As second purpose, however, we analyze CPSs beyond the automated subsystem using a systems engineering perspective. As Leveson accurately declares: "automation usually does not eliminate humans, but instead raises their tasks to new levels of complexity." 25 Subsequently, we emphasize the need to analyze the complex interactions between humans in the loop and higher levels of automation. 30 This emphasis is pertinent in CPSs to avoid reducing the system to the technical components and automated functions, but also consider the human roles and their implications in the CPS. 1 TA B L E 1 Levels of automation, adapted from 30 As shown in Table 1 Accordingly, this paper considers a system to be a CPS if it has the capability to operate in level of automation six (6) or higher, in the scale from 1 to 10 shown in Table 1 . Namely, as a lower bound or threshold, the computer "allows the human a restricted time to veto before automatic execution."
Given that this CPS threshold of automation is general in scope but detailed in description, it is suited for extrapolation to other Other societies have developed their own criteria for levels of automation in their particular sectors, such as railway, 72 ships, 73 aircraft, 74 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 75 among others. Table 2 compares these sector-based criteria and assign a threshold in the level of automation to categorize these (semi)autonomous transportation systems as CPSs. For other CPS applications (eg, industrial control systems, smart medical devices), the systems under analysis share similar characteristics when regarded as CPSs.
Overall, the CPS threshold of automation (level 6 in Table 1 ) is equivalent to systems "c" and "d" in the uses of computers in control loops proposed by Leveson, 25 as illustrated in In the future, the evolution in CPSs could lead to fully automatic and adaptable control systems, ceasing to require human supervisory control. Arguably, the advances in AI could entirely substitute the role of humans in supervisory control decisions and manual labor. 10, 11 However, the current stage of technological development of CPSs is at its infancy 76 and many practitioners recognize the essential need for humans in the loop for the future of autonomous systems. 77 Furthermore, the integration of traditional control algorithms and networked communications with physical processes already pose significant challenges for safety and security, considering their implementation in safety-critical systems. 5,29,78,79
Sharing and trading control: Human roles in (semi)automated processes
From a systems engineering perspective, one should not neglect the interactions between humans and technology in automated systems.
For example, a designer could be tempted to consider the human as another technical component or a deterministic input-output agent.
However, Rasmussen 80 emphasized that human behavior is teleological by nature, that is, operators act according to goal-oriented beliefs predicated on available information. In other words, humans (re)act differently in different situations, in contrast to fixed computer algorithms. In (semi)automated systems, these situations range from repetitive routines with low alertness levels, to unfamiliar tasks under stressful circumstances. We extrapolate this analysis to CPSs, since CPSs are changing the way humans interact with control systems. 1 As specified by Sheridan, 30 many systems allow for different levels of sharing and trading control between computers and humans.
In sharing control, humans and computers perform different control actions in parallel. In other cases, a trading control capability allows for turning complete control to the computer; in case of fully autonomous control, the human only monitors in normal conditions, but can take over partial or total control if necessary.
Therefore, the notion of cooperative control is also possible between computers and humans, expanding the notion of cooperative automatic subsystems presented in DNCSs in Section 2.2. In other words, although computers close the feedback control loops in CPSs, humans are in the loop at different levels depending on the system architecture and on the specific circumstance.
This flexibility in automation allows the system to adapt and reduce the level of automation when it is required. On the one hand, this adaptability enhances the system safety under unforeseen circumstances, allowing human operators to deviate the system from prescribed procedures when needed to guarantee safety conditions. On the other hand, this capacity to manipulate the system opens the possibility for erroneous executions, canceling some strengths of system automation such as reliability and predictive performance.
The notion of cooperative control between computers and humans in CPSs is consistent with the theory of distributed situation awareness (DSA). 81 According to DSA, human and nonhuman agents hold situation awareness with different views of the system conditions and with overlapping or complementary goals. In some cases, an agent may compensate the degradation of situation awareness of another agent. This property entails that the system as a whole is the entity that holds all relevant knowledge, whereas different individuals have partial views.
However, the partial views of individual agents must be sufficient to perform the tasks assigned to each of them. Even when communication between individual agents is imperfect, they must be able to have awareness of the views of other agents and interpret the information passing through the system.
Several factors compromise the intended human-machine interactions. For example, lack of training, complicated human-machine interfaces (HMIs), lower levels of human alertness, and design constraints, increase the likelihood of accidents due to human-task mismatches. 25, 82 Specially in semi-automated systems with safetycritical scenarios, designers must address the potential reduction of situation awareness in human operators. 83 Conflicting commands with ambiguous privilege protocols between automatic controllers and human controllers could also result in system errors, ranging from degraded performance to economic and safety consequences.
Overall, Leveson 25 
Humans as sources of safety and security risk in CPSs
Human roles should be identified and included as potential sources of risk in CPSs. Even if computers close the feedback control loops, humans could still perform complementary roles in cyber processes, such as data insertion, intermittent modifications, and parameter readings, among others. 25 Therefore, we consider humans as crucial actors in CPSs, despite the higher levels of automation incorporated in these systems.
On the one hand, human operators are sources of risk of unintentional motive, that is, with the potential to cause accidents traditionally assessed by safety analysts. In this sense, Taylor 84 described a methodology to assess human error in process plants, covering human error modes as well as latent hazards caused by the system design configuration. On the other hand, both malicious insiders and external cyberattackers could deliberately disrupt CPSs using acquired knowledge of the system's security vulnerabilities and the dependencies between its system layers. 53, 85 These two sources of risk are different in motive (ie, unintentional and deliberate) and require a comprehensive approach to prevent or mitigate their potential safety-related consequences. Even if these different motives would independently lead to the same harmful consequence, the causal events in each case could require different protection measures in the system. From these considerations, Table 3 summarizes the roles of humans within the system and in the surrounding environments as sources of risks from both unintentional and deliberate motives, that is, from a combined safety and security perspective.
Humans as prone to safety risks in CPSs
Human safety is also a matter of concern in the physical processes governed by CPSs. For example, new potential human harm scenarios arise from the capacity of collaborative robots to work alongside humans in factories, removing the zonal barriers dividing workers and machines and allowing human-robot interaction in physical activities. 86 Furthermore, accidents involving industrial robots still pose a risk to humans, even when there is apparent separation in their controlled tasks. In December 2018, an accident involving an Amazon's in New Jersey. 87 After spreading through the warehouse ventilation system, workers became exposed and two dozen of them had to be hospitalized. Moreover, this event is not isolated and has occurred in other facilities. 88 Other notorious cases for human safety are transportation systems.
Recent fatal accidents involved vehicles operating in semi-autonomous mode. The fatal Tesla crash in March 2018 resulted in the death of the driver after the car crashed to a median barrier. 89 During the same month, an Uber in self-driving mode was the first reported crash of an autonomous vehicle killing a pedestrian. 77 These two events resulted from unintentional errors, that is, they did not involve intentional cyber-attacks.
Generalizing these examples to the context of CPSs, safety risks threaten human and assets within the system itself (eg, vehicle drivers, plant workers, patients wearing medical devices). Moreover, safety risks in CPSs also extend beyond the system boundaries and pose concerns to humans, assets, and the natural environment interacting with the system in physical terms. In the next section, we describe a multilayered diagrammatic representation of CPSs to identify these scenarios and determine their risk sources.
A GENERAL REPRESENTATION OF CPSs FOR COMBINED SAFETY AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
The notion of CPSs is a class of engineered systems grouped by a set of key features. This generalization is a useful framework to analyze these systems according to a common representation, while allowing for the incorporation of their distinctive characteristics within a general framework. As a result, designers, operators, and risk analysts from many disciplines can communicate and collaborate using this common representation as contextual perspective.
Although several methods have attempted a safety and security analysis integration, [15] [16] [17] [18] researchers have paid little attention to providing a comprehensive systems representation of CPSs for designers and risk analysts to visualize the relevant features of the system. Therefore, the field of safety analysis requires a new systems engineering representation that serves as a basis for a comprehensive safety and security risk analysis method in CPSs. 21, 22 This representation should understand the key features of CPSs explained in Section 2 and the evolving roles of humans in automation examined in Section 3.
In this context, we consider necessary to apply systems thinking to encompass the system interactions and feedback loops at different levels.
To facilitate the identification of safety and security risks in a wide range of CPSs, we refine the model of CPS aspects proposed by Humayed et al. 49 In their comprehensive review, they conceived Subsequently, we conceive the cyber, cyber-physical, and physical aspects as technologies and entities responsible for the execution of process types in a cooperative multi-layered system. Thus, these processes can be diagrammatically located in layers of the system, controlling particular sets of information and energy flows. In the next paragraphs, we define information and energy flows. Additionally, CPSs integrate cyber processes on top of the cyberphysical ones. Usually, these information flows are subject to supervision and monitoring in control centers through dedicated HW and SW. Thus, the human role appears as a monitoring and control agent in those cases where the system architecture did not consider realtime automation. Moreover, the human can access through HMIs the components performing cyber-physical processes to adjust inputs and parameters during different circumstances. Cloud platforms and cloud computing are also possibilities at this level. Furthermore, cyber processes may use different control networks from the cyber-physical ones, thus avoiding data traffic from use cases that do not require real-time processing. Overall, the security of cyber processes are the subject of interest of the cybersecurity field, with emphasis on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. In CPSs, however, cyber-attacks disrupting integrity and availability are the most important security threats leading to safety risks, 78 especially regarding how the influenced information flows affect physical processes.
Information and energy flows in CPS process types
CPS master diagram: A multi-layered representation for safety and security analysis
To provide a comprehensible representation to professionals from multiple disciplines, we organize the CPS in a hierarchic structure of layers, each layer corresponding to the cyber, cyber-physical, and physical processes. A hierarchic structure is useful to conceptualize the subsystems and their interface interactions, 92, 93 in this case from an initial overview at a low level of resolution. Then, we decompose these subsystems in their constituent components with their subsystem interactions, giving a more detailed description of the particular processes.
From the analysis in the previous subsection, in Figure 5 Figure 5 includes the physical and cyber environments, that is, those processes that are not under the control of the system stakeholders and that directly influence the state of the system at different layers.
Particularly, this representation shows:
• The information and energy flows used by the system to perform different processes in feedback control loops Note that some blocks and control loops might not be present in specific CPS applications. Nevertheless, we argue that in principle, CPSs possess all three layers in their architectures and usually interact with both the cyber and physical environments.
In the following sections, we describe in detail the features presented in the CPS master diagram.
Physical layer
In the physical layer, human operators have physical access to the physical components of the system. For example, a human driver manipulates the steering wheel of a vehicle, or an operator manually opens a valve in a process plant. The physical components control a set of physical dynamics, confining energy flows according to the system goals.
In the case of vehicles, they mainly require a control of kinetic energy, while a process plant usually controls a range of energy forms (eg, potential, kinetic, electrical, and chemical). From these physical dynamics, a specific set of measurable quantities provide facts about the state of the system at different timespans. These quantities can be measured by analog sensors or simply perceived by the human operators, who then decide which actions to take to close the feedback control loop in the physical layer.
To conduct these operations, the human should be trained and properly informed of the protocols to follow under different circumstances.
Nevertheless, the human capabilities impede in some cases a real-time response, considering the time needed for humans to process information and take an action. In routine tasks, humans might commit errors of distraction, omission, or wrong executions, although with low probabilities. Conversely, high stress situations and non-routine tasks with reduced time constraints raise the probability of human error.
In terms of security, malicious insiders at the physical layer could use their knowledge of the system to perform dangerous physical manipulations. If the CPS architecture considers this possibility, physical and functional barriers should impede malicious interventions and provide alerts to stop them before leading to hazardous events.
The interface from the physical to the cyber-physical layer
This interface is the entrance of the physical system into the digital world, where computers and networks control information. Particularly, operational technologies (OT) in the cyber-physical layer incorporate the feedback control functions. As an input, sensors perceive physical quantities from the physical layer and transform them into digital packets. As outputs, actuators are responsible of transforming digital commands into energy flows influencing the physical layer.
Cyber-physical layer
In the cyber-physical layer, real-time computations and communications take place. This layer is the entrance of the system into the digital world of computers and communication networks, but specifically to those processes requiring real-time response to control directly the physical processes. These processes in the digital world are named cyber-physical processes.
Traditionally in industrial applications and safety-related systems, these cyber-physical processes have been divided in basic process control system (BPCS) and safety instrumented system (SIS), with independent functions and isolated architectures. 95 In contrast, the cyberphysical layer in CPSs increasingly interconnect and integrate the SIS with the BPCS and higher-level computer systems, 96 exposing the system to new safety issues.
In the cyber-physical layer, sensors perceive the measurable quantities from the physical layer and the physical environment, transforming these quantities from analog form into digital form as information flows. These information flows are transmitted through real-time communication networks. They can operate as wired or wireless communications, depending on the system architecture.
In general, these communications should possess some key features. First, the latency must be low enough to guarantee a timely response to the physical layer. Second, they must provide a sufficient quality of service (QoS) to avoid packet losses, operating according to secure protocols. Additionally, these communications are usually made in a dedicated infrastructure, that is, as a separate network from other processes that do not require real-time capabilities, thus avoiding communication jamming and interference.
In some cases, sensors and the actuators are embedded into motes. Although this information needs energy to be transferred and manipulated, the abstraction of information flows stresses the main function of these processes to control (eg, collect, process, and send)
information. Subsequently, the energies involved in these processes (eg, electric currents, electromagnetic waves) are means to control information. The same reasoning applies for the cyber layer, as explained in the next paragraphs.
The interface from the cyber-physical to the cyber layer
In principle, the entire infrastructure in the cyber-physical layer is located at the edge of the physical processes. In this way, the communications do not require long travel distances that could represent a higher latency. Moreover, cyber-physical processes do not incorporate the human controllers. In other words, humans are out of the loop in the cyber-physical layer, considering the real-time capabilities that humans cannot provide through the system using HMIs. These two characteristics (real-time response and human out of the loop) are the main differences between the cyber-physical and the cyber layer.
The transition from the cyber-physical to the cyber layer can materialize in two different ways. The first way is the direct transmission of information flows from the programmable controllers to local human supervisors via HMIs, not requiring real-time processing as monitoring or maintenance functions. The second way is through the digital transmission of information flows from the controllers to the cyber network. In this case, the cyber network transmits this information to describe the state of the system at different time intervals, providing valuable inputs to the supervisory control system and human operators at remote locations. In return, the cyber layer can respond by sending information flows to the programmable controllers or directly to the actuators, allowing trading control capabilities in established cases.
Other particular flows across these layers include the cases where humans edit the parameters of sensors through HMIs. Similarly, actuators could send information flows about their status to the cyber layer. These two cases go in the opposite direction to the main loops of the system, evidencing the complexity in the dependencies in CPSs between their cyber-physical and cyber layers.
The integration of these cases are the means by which cyber threats (unintentionally or deliberately) disrupting the cyber layer can propagate to the cyber-physical layer.
Cyber layer
The cyber layer encompasses those processes in the digital world of 
CPS system boundary and the surrounding environments
The CPS master diagram considers a CPS as a system of three interacting layers. However, a complete picture of CPSs should consider that this system is also interacting with its environments. In this context, we draw the boundaries between the system and its environment with respect to the domain of responsibility of the CPS stakeholder.
The system is composed by the cyber, cyber-physical, and physical processes that are within the control of the system stakeholder (eg, the plant or infrastructure managers, vehicle operators, medical device managers). Outside this domain, we subdivide the environments interacting with the system into a cyber and a physical environment. In terms of the CPS master diagram, the cyber environment is only exchanging information flows with the cyber and cyber-physical layers of the system, while the physical environment interacts with all the layers of the system through energy and analog information flows.
The following paragraphs explain the characteristics of these environments and their interactions with the CPS.
Physical environment
The physical environment is the set of external entities, infrastruc- In the opposite direction, the CPS can also influence its surrounding physical environment. From a safety point of view, elements of the physical environment may be vulnerable to CPS-driven hazards. Particularly, people, assets, or natural environments located geographically near to the physical layer of the CPS (or describing physical dependencies with CPS functions) may experience losses due to hazardous events arising from within the CPS. In the CPS master diagram, this case arises as an uncontrolled flow of energy going from the physical layer of the system toward the physical environment. In other words, energy outputs of the system (eg, kinetic, chemical, thermal, and radioactive) can become safety hazards to the physical environment when a loss of confinement of these energies occur. 97 These hazards may materialize into physical harm to people (eg, fatalities, severe injuries), asset damage (eg, collisions, fires, explosions), or impacts to the natural environment (eg, pollution, biodiversity loss, and ecosystem degradation). 19 All these safety-related impacts are the subject of study of safety analysis, while other types of losses (eg, financial losses, reputation losses) may also result from these incidents. Loss of control of vehicles or mobile machinery, plant explosions, fires, and toxic releases are some hazardous events arising from the physical layer with the potential to cause physical harm to the physical environment.
Cyber environment
In contrast to the physical environment, the cyber environment is the set of external infrastructures and services interacting with the CPS in functional terms through digital information flows. This domain may include a wide range of information and communication services.
A first example is the case of external communication networks, that is, communication systems not controlled by the CPS operators.
The cyber and cyber-physical layers of the CPS may operate using cellular communications provided by external vendors, while also these layers can be connected to the internet via internet service providers to exchange relevant information with other systems.
A second example is the case of external control centers, that is, 
External interactions between cyber and physical environments
For completeness, the CPS master diagram includes the energy and information flows exchanged between the cyber and physical environments of the system. These interactions illustrate the dependencies that could exist among the different environments. While normally these interactions fall outside the scope of the safety analysis of the system, some critical CPSs could require a deeper analysis of the environmental functions surrounding the system. In this way, the environmental deviations eventually disrupting the system could be traced back to their external causes, following the causal chains across different systems with several stakeholders involved. These cases could be relevant in critical infrastructure protection and other CPSs with regional or national security implications. 101,102
A DEMONSTRATION OF THE CPS MASTER DIAGRAM IN THE MARITIME SECTOR
In this section, we demonstrate an application of the CPS master diagram to represent an ASV. In doing so, we demonstrate the advantages In this case, we analyze the Telemetron ASV-Maritime Robotics' Polar Circle 845 Sport vessel 103 -a real scale testbed that incorporates autopilot mode and a collision avoidance system (COLAV). Figure 6 illustrates the vessel driving at sea.
Conceptualizing an autonomous surface vehicle as a CPS
The Telemetron ASV is equipped with radar sensors and an automatic identification system (AIS), the latter being the integration of a satellite navigation system with an inertial navigation system. In the ASV architecture, a programmable controller on-board reads the inputs from these sensors and processes them according to a control logic, providing the system with the capability to operate in autopilot mode while navigating at sea according to a pre-established route. Moreover, a COLAV is able to detect other vessels in the vicinity, modify the route, and issue the corresponding control commands to avoid collision according to the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea (COLREGS). 103 In the following paragraphs, we argue that this ASV incorporates the key features of CPSs described in Section 2. (2) The cooperative control among networked subsystems consists of the trading control capabilities of the system to change from autonomous to manual mode. Operators can obtain this control in two ways, according to the system architecture. In the first mode, on-board operators can use a switch to take over physical control of the steering wheel and the electromechanical propulsion system (human control at physical layer). In the second mode, human supervisors using HMIs wired to the controller can use a button in the screen to take control over the vessel and assign steering angles and propulsion speed (human control at cyber layer). Moreover, humans in a remote control workstation could also take control over the vessel as described in the second mode, but in this case transmit the information through wireless communications.
(3) The threshold of automation level where computers close the feedback control loops in (semi)automated tasks (level 6 or higher in Table 1 ) is also present. The ASV can navigate at sea in autopilot mode and react to obstacles in the environment through the COLAV system. From a sector-based criteria of autonomy levels (AL), 73 Finally, industrial recommended practices such as DNVGL-RP-0496 63 stress the potential of cyber-attacks to penetrate the marine vessels, disrupting the operational technology (OT) of the system, and reaching physical consequences. Therefore, we locate potential attackers at physical environment (saboteur) as well as the cyber environment (hacker). In Appendix A, we provide an expanded version of the CPS master diagram of the ASV, illustrating the specific technologies inside each component block and a selection of types of attacks potentially disrupting the system at different layers.
A concept for combined safety and security risk analysis: Avoiding physical harm
Using the CPS master diagram defined in this paper as a framework for risk analysis, practitioners from multiple disciplines can apply existing or new risk identification techniques to analyze different CPS applications. As an alternative, in further work we aim at providing a risk identification method for CPSs, conceptualizing the deviation of cyber processes as Uncontrolled Flows of Information (UFoI). These deviationsranging from unintended incidents to deliberate attacks-are sources of risk to the system at the cyber and cyber-physical layers.
The concept of UFoI refines the Uncontrolled Flow of Energy (UFoE) model proposed in 97 to the field of CPS, considering that cyber, cyberphysical, and physical processes are interdependent and interact with their environments. Therefore, we could model the dependencies
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CONCLUSIONS
This paper conceptualized CPSs as engineered systems that integrate information technologies, real-time control subsystems, physical components, and human operators to influence physical processes by means of cooperative and (semi)automated control functions. We identified the key features of CPSs as (1) 
